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JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL: AN ANALYSIS
OF HIS FIRST YEARS ON THE COURT, 1967-1971
RANDALL WALTON BLAND*
Following a tradition begun by President Truman when he appeared
at the swearing-in ceremony for Associate Justice Harold H. Burton in
1945, President Lyndon Johnson quietly took his seat in the "family
section" close to the bench in the Supreme Court building. He watched
intently as Thurgood Marshall swore to "administer justice without re-
spect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich." Mar-
shall was President Johnson's second appointee to the Court (Abe Fortas
having been the first.) Seated next to the President on this warm morning
in October 1967 was retired Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark, whose
seat Marshall was assuming. The new Associate Justice, smiling broadly
after taking the oath, was congratulated by Justice Byron R. White, who
would sit nearest to him on the Court. At the conclusion of the five-minute
ceremony, President Johnson strode quickly from the chambers, leaving
Marshall and the other eight justices on the bench to admit 223 lawyers
before the Court. The newcomer's face reflected justifiable pride as he
nodded to members of his family, including his wife, Cecilia, and their
sons, Thurgood Jr., eleven years old, and John William, nine. Few could
have suspected at the time that the first four years Marshall was to serve
on the Court would be marked by turmoil and transition.
THE WARREN YEARS: 1967-1969
The addition of Marshall to the Court to replace Tom Clark strength-
ened the "liberal" majority to include Warren, Fortas, Brennan, Douglas,
Marshall, and in most cases, Black, while the erstwhile "conservatives"
were reduced to three: Harlan, Stewart, and White. Aside from the health
of Douglas and Black, there was no reason to doubt that the philosophical
thrust of the activist Warren Court would remain intact for some time.
Indeed, an examination of the new Associate Justice's voting behavior
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Southwest Texas State University;
B.A., Texas A&M University, 1964; M.A., 1966, Ph.D., 1971, University of Notre
Dame. The above article is taken from the author's forthcoming book, Private
Pressure on Public Law: The Legal Career of Justice Thurgood Marshall, Na-
tional University Publications, Kennikat Press, Port Washington, New York
(1973).
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during his first two terms shows very little deviation from the other
members of the "liberal" bloc.
During the 1967 term 110 opinions were written in disposing of the
cases argued before the Court. Of these, Marshall wrote ten majority
opinions, three concurring opinions, one dissenting opinion and joined
with the majority in thirty-nine others. Having served as Solicitor Gen-
eral, the new Associate Justice did not participate in fifty-seven cases in
which the government had an interest.'
Of Marshall's majority opinions during the term, five were of such
constitutional significance as to bear close examination; three in the area
of First Amendment freedoms and two cases dealing with the rights of
the accused. In Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676
(1968), Marshall, speaking for a majority of the Court, with Associate
Justice Harlan dissenting, held that a city ordinance establishing a motion
picture classification board to classify films as suitable or not suitable for
young persons under sixteen years old violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments on the grounds of vagueness. Under the terms of the ordi-
nance, the board was to classify as "unsuitable" any film which described
or portrayed "sexual promiscuity or extra-martial or abnormal sexual
relations in such a manner as ... likely to incite or encourage delinquency
or sexual promiscuity on the part of young persons or to appeal to their
prurient interests." Upon objection of the exhibitor as to the classification,
the board was required to file suit to enjoin the showing of the picture,
which thereafter was subject to de novo review. In this case the court
found as "not suitable" the film "Viva Maria" without giving reasons
for its determination. After a de novo hearing, an injunction was issued
by the trial court to prevent showing of the film.
In delivering the opinion of the Court, Marshall noted in part:
The vice of vagueness is particularly pronounced where expression
is sought to be subjected to licensing. It may be unlikely that what Dallas
does in respect to the licensing of motion pictures would have a sig-
nificant effect upon film makers in Hollywood or Europe. But what
Dallas may constitutionally do, so may other cities and states ...
' For a concise description of the work of the Court each term, see Paul C.
Bartholomew, "The Supreme Court of the United States," Western Political Quar-
terly, December 1968, December 1969, March 1970, December 1971. Among the
more significant cases in which Marshall did not participate were United States v.
Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) ; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S., 347 (1967) ; Schneider
v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968);
Avery v. Midland County, Texas, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); and United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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The First Amendment interests here are, therefore, broader than merely
those of the film maker, distributor, and exhibitor, and certainly
broader than those of youths under 16.
The Associate Justice went on to state that the problem of vagueness
inherent in such terms as "sexual promiscuity" is not solved by affording
de novo review, since such "standards, unless narrowed by interpretation,
encourage erratic administration whether the censor be administrative or
judicial." Noting the specific and limited concern of the ordinance to
juveniles, in compliance with Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965),
Marshall nevertheless concluded:
Vagueness and [its] attendant evils . . . are not rendered less ob-
jectionable because the regulation of expression is one of classification
rather than direct suppression.... Nor it is an answer.., to say that
it was adopted for the solitary purpose of protecting children. The per-
missible extent of vagueness is not directly proportional to, or a func-
tion of, the extent of the power to regulate or control expression with
respect to children.
In Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391
U.S. 308 (1968), the Court was concerned with a related question as to
whether the peaceful picketing of private property devoted to a public
use is protected by the free speech provision of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Answering in the affirmative, Marshall, in a 6-3 decision
(Justices Black, Harlan, and White dissenting in separate opinions), held
that a union may peacefully picket a business enterprise located within a
shopping center without constituting an unconstitutional invasion of
property rights:
We start from the premise that peaceful picketing carried on in a
location open generally to the public is, absent other factors involving
the purpose or manner of the picketing, protected by the First Amend-
ment. . . . To be sure, this Court has noted that picketing involves
elements of both speech and conduct, i.e., patrolling.... Nevertheless,
no case decided by this Court can be found to support the proposition
that the nonspeech aspects ... are so great as to render the provisions
of the First Amendment inapplicable to it altogether.
Accordingly, and with reference to Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88
(1940), the Associate Justice concluded:
... the State may not delegate the power, through the use of its trespass
laws, wholly to exclude those members of the public wishing to exercise
3
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their First Amendment rights on the premises in a manner and for
a purpose generally consonant with the use to which the property is
actually put.
The third speech case-Pickering v. Board of Education of Township
High School District 205, Will County, 391 U.S. 563 (1968)--concerned
the dismissal of a high-school teacher for publicly criticizing a policy de-
cision of the local board of education. Marvin Pickering of Illinois had
been dismissed by the board for writing and publishing in a newspaper a
letter which attacked the board's allocation of school-bond funds between
educational and athletic programs and its methods of preventing disclosure
of the "real reasons" why additional tax revenues were being sought for
the schools. After a hearing, the board found the contents of the letter to be
false and "detrimental to the efficient operation and administration of the
schools of the district." Pickering was dismissed in the "interests of the
school." The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the dismissal, rejecting the
teacher's claim that the letter was protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. In an 8-1 decision (Justice White dissenting in part), the
Supreme Court of the United States reversed. Speaking for the majority,
Marshall stated in part:
To the extent that the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion may be
read to suggest that teachers may constitutionally be compelled to re-
linquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as
citizens to comment on matters of public interest in connection with the
operation of the public schools in which they work, it proceeds on a
premise that has been unequivocally rejected in numerous prior decisions
of this Court .... The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance be-
tween the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon mat-
ters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees.
In the conclusion of his opinion, the Associate Justice directed his at-
tention to the charge that certain statements made by Pickering were false
and thus "damaging" to his position as a teacher:
What we do have before us is a case in which a teacher had made er-
roneous public statements upon issues then currently the subject of pub-
lic attention . . . but which are neither shown nor can be presumed to
have in any way either impeded the teacher's proper performance of
his daily duties in the classroom or to have interfered with the regular
operation of the schools generally ... we conclude that the interest of
4
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the school administration in limiting teachers' opportunities to con-
tribute to public debate is not significantly greater than its interest in
limiting a similar contribution by any member of the general public.
The two remaining opinions delivered by Marshall which warrant
discussion are Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) and Powell v. Texas,
392 U.S. 514 (1968). In the former case Barber was convicted of armed
robbery in Oklahoma primarily on the basis of incriminating statements
made by his accomplice at a preliminary hearing. At the time of Barber's
trial the accomplice was confined to federal prison in Texas. The prosecu-
tion, while making no effort to obtain the presence of the witness at the
trial, introduced a transcript of the preliminary hearing as evidence, over
the objection of the defense attorney that its admission violated the right
of confrontation of witnesses as protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The contention was rejected by the federal district court
and the Court of Appeals. In a 9-0 decision, the Supreme Court reversed
and remanded the case for further proceedings. In delivering the opinion
of the Court, Marshall stated:
The right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes both
the opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion for the jury to weigh
the demeanor of the witness. A preliminary hearing is ordinarily a much
less searching exploration into the merits of a case than a trial, simply
because its function is the more limited one of determining whether
probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial. While there may be
some justification for holding that the opportunity for cross-examination
of testimony at a preliminary hearing satisfies the demands of the con-
frontation clause where the witness is shown to be actually unavailable,
this is not ... such a case.
In the latter case the Court, in a 5-4 decision (Justices Douglas, Bren-
nan, and Stewart joining Justice Fortas in dissent), rejected the ap-
pellant's claim that a state's conviction of a chronic alcoholic on the ground
of being "found drunk or in a state of intoxication in a public place"
violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Powell, the appellant,
based his claim on Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), in that
chronic alcoholism constitutes a disease and that imprisonment under the
circumstances described, results in a cruel and unusual punishment.'
2 In Robinson the Court had held a California law providing criminal punish-
ment for drug addiction, as opposed to illegal possession or sale, to be an imposition
of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.
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While recognizing "the comparatively primitive state of our knowledge"
on the nature of alcoholism, the Court refused to draw a parallel between
the contentions made in the present case and those made in Robinson.
Marshall noted:
. . . we are unable to assert that the use of the criminal process as a means
of dealing with the public aspects of problem drinking can never be
defended as rational. The picture of the penniless drunk propelled aim-
lessly and endlessly through the law's "revolving door" of arrest, in-
carceration, release and re-arrest is not a pretty one [but] . . . This
Court has never held that anything in the Constitution requires that
penal sanctions be designed solely to achieve therapeutic or rehabilita-
tive effects, and it can hardly be said with assurance that incarceration
serves such purposes any better for the general run of criminals than it
does for public drunks.
An examination of Marshall's first term on the Court clearly demon-
strates a high degree of cohesion in his behavior with the other members
of the "liberal" bloc which bore fruit in a number of significant decisions.
Indeed, the only dissent he authored during the term was in a case in which
the majority held void the Massachusetts sales tax and use tax as applied
to national banks. 3
When the Court adjourned on June 17, 1968, Chief Justice Warren
tendered his resignation on the condition that the Senate confirm .Pres-
ident Johnson's nomination of Associate Justice Abe Fortas as his suc-
cessor. The President, known to be a close associate of Fortas, also
nominated his old friend Federal Judge Homer Thornberry of Texas
to fill the vacant slot on the Court. A political controversy of the first
magnitude developed after a disclosure of the financial indiscretions of
Justice Fortas during his tenure on the Court. With increasing charges
of "cronyism" in the selection of ,the two men by the President, both with-
drew their names from consideration prior to the Senate vote. Fortas was
moved to resign from the Court altogether on May 14, 1969.
The performance of the Supreme Court itself became an issue in the
presidential election of 1968. Opponents of the Warren Court openly ac-
cused the "liberal" majority of causing a breakdown of law and order
'Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
510 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S.
40 (1968); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409 (1968); Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S.
430 (1968). Associate Justices Harlan and Stewart joined in the dissenting opinion,
First Agricultural National Bank v. State Tax Commission, 392 U.S. 339 (1968).
6
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in the United States by its decisions expanding the rights of the accused
in criminal cases at the expense of the victims and the police. Prior to his
election, Richard M. Nixon announced that if elected, he would appoint
* . . strict constructionists who saw their duty as interpreting law not
making law. They would see themselves as caretakers of the Constitution
and servants of the people, not super-legislators with a free hand to im-
pose their social and political viewpoints upon the American people.4
Of course Nixon's statement encompassed the view of one side of the
age-old argument on the role of the Court in our constitutional frame-
work; in the political context of the campaign, however, the implication
was clear-if ,he were elected, his nominees would preferably be "con-
servative," practitioners of judicial self-restraint, Southern, and Repub-
lican. With the passage of time and the development of events, it 'became
evident that Thurgood Marshall was to be the last appointee to the Su-
preme Court not subjected to a maximum amount of public and political
scrutiny.
The 1968 term served as the last for the Warren Court, and apparently
the political controversy surrounding that body had little effect in blunting
the liberal thrust of its decisions. Again Mr. Justice Marshall joined
consistently with his liberal brethren in most of the decisions handed down
by the Court. Out of 99 written opinions delivered during the term, the
Associate Justice dissented in six; concurred in three; and joined in the
majority opinion on 66 occasions. As expected, Marshall participated
more fully in his second term than in his first by taking part in the de-
liberation of all but eleven written opinions. During the term, the As-
sociate Justice wrote thirteen majority opinions, of which two bear some
measure of attention.5
The first involved Stanley, a citizen of Georgia, who was arrested for
possession of obscene material in violation of state law. The arrest took
' Speech of November 2, 1968, as cited in Congressional Quarterly, Weekly Re-
port, May 23, 1969, p. 798.
Marshall dissented in United States v. Container Corporation of America, 393
U.S. 333 (1969) ; Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) ; Boulden
v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478 (1969); Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62 (1969); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969);
Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 395 U.S. 642 (1969). He concurred in
Commonwealth Coatings Corporation v. Continental Casualty Company, 393 U.S.
145 (1968); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Company, 394 U.S. 759 (1969); North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). Included among the more important cases
in which Marshall took no part were Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394
U.S. 147 (1969); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Kaufman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969) ; Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
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place after federal and state forces had searcled his home under the au-
thority of a warrant to search for evidence of his alleged bookmaking ac-
tivities. Finding little evidence of bookmaking, the officers found in his
bedroom three reels of eight-millimeter film which, after viewing, they
found to be obscene. The Supreme Court of Georgia upheld Stanley's con-
viction and based the validity of the state statute on the Court's opinion
in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1857), that "obscenity is not
within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press." In a 9-0 de-
cision in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), the Supreme Court
of the United States reversed the state court's judgment and remanded
the case for further proceedings. Speaking for the majority, Justice Mar-
shall noted in part:
... we do not believe that this case can be decided simply by citing Roth.
Roth and its progeny certainly do mean that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments recognize a valid governmental interest in dealing with
the problem of obscenity. But the assertion of that interest cannot, in
every context, be insulated from all constitutional protections. Neither
Roth nor any other decision of this Court reaches that far .... That
holding cannot foreclose an examination of the constitutional implica-
tions of a statute forbidding mere private possession of such material.
In concluding his opinion, the Associate Justice focused on the rights
claimed by the appellant:
He is asserting the right to read or observe what he pleases-the
right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of
his own home. He is asserting the right to be free from state inquiry
into the contents of his library .... Whatever may be the justifications
for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into
the privacy of one's own home. If the First Amendment means any-
thing, it means that a state has no business telling a man, sitting alone
in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch.
Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving gov-
ernment the power to control men's minds.
In the second case, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), the
Court, in a 7-2 decision, held that the double-jeopardy prohibition of the
Fifth Amendment is a fundamental ideal in our constitutional heritage
and is enforceable against the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In overruling the thirty-two year precedent
established in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), Mr. Justice
Marshall, speaking for the majority, expressed a viewpoint he had held
8
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for some time, as was made clear in his majority opinion in United States
er rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844 (1955).
Palko represented an approach to basic constitutional rights which
this court's recent decisions have rejected ... that [they] can be denied
by the States as long as the totality of the circumstances does not dis-
close a denial of "fundamental fairness." Once it is decided that a par-
ticular Bill of Rights guarantee is "fundamental to the American
scheme of justice" . . . the same constitutional standards supply against
both the State and the Federal governments. Palko's roots had thus been
cut away years ago. We today only recognize the inevitable.
The Associate Justice also joined with the majority in a number of
otherwise significant decisions during the 1968 term. An 8-1 majority
held Ohio's requirements for a new political party, to be placed on the
ballot for the general election as applied to the American Independent
Party of George Wallace, violated the Equal-Protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. In a 9-0 decision the Court upheld the right of a racist
organization to express its provocative views at a public rally, even
though a tense atmosphere existed at the time. Marshall joined with six
of his colleagues in holding that secondary-school children do have 'basic
free-speech rights and cannot be suspended for wearing black armbands
showing their opposition on America's involvement in Vietnam. A 6-3
majority struck down the one-year residency requirement of Connecticut
as a prerequisite for payment to welfare recipients. Finally, he joined the
majority in a 5-4 per curiam decision in which the Court overruled Whit-
ney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), to invalidate the Ohio Criminal
Syndicalism Statute as applied to state punishment of the advocacy of
violent acts.6
On May 4 Marshall delivered an address to the students of Dillard
University in New Orleans which attracted national attention. Recalling
the urban rioting which had occurred during the past year and the rising
frustrations of more militant Negroes, he reaffirmed his belief that indi-
viduals and groups can 'best obtain their objectives through the legitimate
channels of the judicial and legislative processes. Warning his young Ne-
gro audience against the self-defeating use of force and violence, the As-
sociate Justice stated:
'Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); Carroll v. President and Commis-
sioners of Prince Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dis-
trict, 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); and
Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
9
Bland: Justice Thurgood Marshall: An Analysis of His First Years on the
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1973
192 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
I know that you have to look to our government and our institu-
tions .... Why demonstrate if you don't know what you're demonstrat-
ing for?... I say that because I am a man of the law, and in my book,
anarchy is anarchy is anarchy.7
By the end of the term President Nixon was given the opportunity to
live up to his campaign pledge to "balance" the Court by the resignations
of Abe Fortas and Chief Justice Warren; despite the political controversy
which had surrounded the Johnson nominations, Nixon had little trouble
in winning Senate confirmation for his first nominee, Warren Earl Burger.
The former Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia, known as a moderate on civil rights who opposed the direction of the
Court in criminal cases, was easily confirmed by the Senate to succeed
Earl Warren as Chief Justice on June 9, 1969. Thereafter the President's
troubles began.
In attempting to fill the seat vacated by Fortas, President Nixon twice
tried to appoint Southerners to the Court and failed on each occasion. On
November 22, 1969, the Senate rejected the nomination of Clement F.
Haynsworth, Jr., a conservative federal judge on the Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit, from South Carolina, by a vote of 55-45. Critics of Hayns-
worth cited conflict of interest based on his huge diversified financial hold-
ings, as well as his supposed anti-labor, anti-civil-rights voting record.
The Haynsworth nomination was so politically unpalatable to the Senate
that seventeen members of the President's own party voted against con-
firmation. The President's second choice, G. Harrold Carswell, a federal
judge from Florida, also a Southern conservative, suffered a similar fate.
Carswell, his opponents charged, was racially biased and simply not
qualified for the appointment. On April 9, 1970, the Senate by a vote of
51-45 defeated his bid for confirmation. Nixon, accusing the Senate of
prejudice against the South, finally nominated Federal Judge Harry A.
Blackmun of Minnesota, who was confirmed by the Senate with little dif-
ficulty shortly thereafter.
Although President Nixon's later selections of Louis Powell and Wil-
liam Rehnquist to fill the vacated seats of Associate Justices Hugo Black
and John M. Harlan were approved by the Senate, confirmation came only
after close and detailed examinations of -their backgrounds. The Senate
has served notice that henceforth appointments to the High Court would
"A Supreme Court Justice's Warning to Fellow Negroes," U.S. News and
World Report, May 19, 1969, pp. 92-93.
10
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be subject to public scrutiny and would not be solely within the presidential
prerogative.
THE BURGER COURT: 1969-1971
The 1969 -term was somewhat unusual: not only did the Court have
a new Chief Justice, but it also functioned with only eight members for
most of the term, until Harry Blackmun took his seat on June 9, 1970.
There was nothing unusual about the philosophical direction of the Court's
opinions during the term, however. The replacement of Burger for War-
ren did not realign the voting pattern of the Court to any noticeable de-
gree.
In examining Marshall's behavior during the term, it is sufficient to
note that with few exceptions he voted with the "liberal" bloc. Out of
eighty-eight written opinions during the term, the Associate Justice
wrote ten majority opinions, including an opinion in chambers as Cir-
cuit Justice for the Seventh Circuit, dissented on four occasions, con-
curred in four, took no part in ten, and joined with the majority view in
sixty-one decisions.8
Only one of Marshall's opinions for the majority is sufficiently note-
worthy to warrant description. Cornman and others lived on the grounds
of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), a federal enclave in Mont-
gomery County, Maryland. In October 1968 they were declared by the
Permanent Board of Registry not to 'be qualified voters under Article I,
Section I of the state constitution. They brought suit against the members
of the Board, requesting that a three-judge district court be convened to
enjoin as unconstitutional the application of the state residency law. The
district court issued a temporary restraining order to allow the plaintiffs
to vote in the 1968 general election, holding that to deny these registered
persons the right to vote violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
' The opinion in chambers was Brussel v. United States, 396 U.S. 1229 (1969).
Marshall dissented in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970) ;
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). He concurred in Turner v. United States,
396 U.S. 398 (1970) ; Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970); Dickey v. Florida,
398 U.S. 30 (1970); Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224 (1970). Among the more sig-
nificant of the cases in which he joined the majority were Alexander v. Holmes
County Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19 (1969); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435(1970); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Hoyt
v. Nebraska, 397 U.S. 524 (1970) ; Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) ;
Schact v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.
333 (1970).
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teenth Amendment. In an 8-0 decision in Evans v. Corman, 398 U.S. 419
(1970), with Justice Blackmun not participating the Court affirmed.
Speaking for -the Court, Marshall noted in part:
In their day-to-day affairs, residents of the NIH grounds are just
as interested in and connected with electoral decisions as they were
prior to 1953 when the area came under federal jurisdiction and as are
their neighbors who live off the enclave. In nearly every election, fed-
eral, state, and the local, for offices from the Presidency to the school
board, and on the entire variety of other ballot propositions, [they]
have a stake equal to that of other Maryland residents ... they are en-
titled under the Fourteenth Amendment to protect that stake by exer-
cising the equal right to vote.
Still other cases may further illuminate Marshall's performance during
the term. In Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970), Marshall joined five
of his colleagues, with Douglas and Brennan dissenting, in upholding
the Georgia Supreme Court's decision which in effect reverted a tract of
land that had originally been willed to Macon, Georgia, as a park for the
exclusive use of white persons, to -the heirs of the deceased. The Court
agreed that its decision in Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966), four
years earlier had rendered impossible the accomplishment of the sole pur-
pose of the deed. In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), a five-
man majority with Douglas, Marshall, and Brennan in dissent, upheld
Maryland's ceiling on the total amount of welfare payments to be received
by a family unit, irrespective of the size of the family, as being consistent
with .the purposes of the Social Security Act and not violative of the Equal
Protection Clause. Marshall, joined by Brennan, disagreed; he found the
state regulation to ,be "fundamentally in conflict" with the Social Security
Act. The Associate Justice continued:
More important in the long run than this misreading of a federal
statute, however, is the Court's emasculation of the Equal Protection
Clause as a constitutional principle applicable to the area of social wel-
fare adminstration. The Court holds today that regardless of the arbi-
trariness of a classification it must be sustained if any state goal can
be imagined that is arguably furthered by its effects.
In a 7-1 decision in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), the
Court held, inter alia, that the "trial by jury" provision of the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments does not forbid states from requiring the use
12
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of a six-man jury for noncapital cases. Marshall dissented from this hold-
ing on the basis of the Court's decision in Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S.
343 (1898) that "the jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment consists
of twelve persons, neither more nor less." The Associate Justice joined
his colleagues in the per curiam opinion of Alexander v. Holmes County
Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19 (1969), which held that it is "the obli-
gation of every school district . . . to terminate dual schools." The Court
went on to say that "all motions for additional time" should be denied by
the lower courts, since "continued operation of segregated schools under a
standard of allowing 'all deliberate speed' for desegregation is no longer
constitutionally permissible." Finally, in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.
333 (1970), Marshall joined with four of his brethren-White, Burger,
and Stewart dissented and Blackmun abstained-in holding that a regis-
trant's conscientious objection to all war is "religious" within the meaning
of Section 6 (j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act if
this objection stems from the registrant's moral, ethical, or religious
beliefs about what is right and wrong and if these beliefs are held with
the strength of traditional religious convictions.9
It should be noted that by the time the Court adjourned on June 29,
1970, Justice Blackmun had joined with the Chief Justice in every major
decision. The possibility that a "conservative" majority consisting of
Harlan, Stewart, White, Blackmun, and Burger, and occasionally Black,
would noticeably alter the philosophical direction of the Court's decisions
was to become a reality.'
Indeed, if one were forced to draw an ideological line of demarcation
between the Warren and Burger Courts, it would properly be drawn with
the 1970 term. Though a number of important decisions rendered during
the term were "liberal" in orientation, the trend was decidedly toward the
"cconservative" point of view. Marshall's behavior during the term ad-
equately serves to lend credence to this assertion. An examination of the
109 written opinions of the Court shows that Marshall dissented on 28
occasions, a number in excess of 25 percent. He most frequently paired
with Justices Douglas and Brennan-perhaps a portent of a "dissenting
'The case was controlled by the Court's decision in United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163 (1965).
0 Blackmun's participation was limited, not only by the fact that it was his first
term, but also by his having joined the Court near the term's end. His most note-
worthy attempt during this period was his dissenting opinion with the Chief Justice
and Justice Harlan in Hoyt v. Minnesota, 399 U.S. 524 (1970).
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bloc" to come. On the other hand, the Associate Justice wrote nine ma-
jority opinions; concurred in six; took no part in one; and joined in the
majority opinion in 65.1
Certainly the most important of Marshall's majortiy opinions de-
livered during the term was in Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437
(1971), together with Negre v. Larsen et al. The two petitioners, Gillette
and Negre, based their claim to conscientious-objector status on their ob-
jection to participation in the Vietnam conflict as an "unjust" war, but not
to -participation in all wars. They challenged the validity of Section 6 (j)
of the Selective Service Act, which requires objectors to be opposed "to
participation in war in any form" as violative of the free exercise and
establishment of religion clauses of the First Amendment.
In an 8-1 decision, with Justice Douglas in dissent, the Court rejected
the claims of the petitioners. Marshall, speaking for the Court, expressed
the view that Congress had the authority to decide in Section 6 (j) "that
the objector to all war-to all killing in war-has a claim that is distinct
enough and intense enough to justify special status, while the objector to a
" See Bartholomew, "The Supreme Court of the United States, 1970-1971,"
Western Political Quarterly, December, 1971. Nearly half the cases in which Mar-
shall dissented were those involving the rights of the accused and criminal pro-
cedure. In five decisions, the question concerned First Amendment freedoms. See
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74
(1970); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Bulk Carriers v. Arquelles,
400 U.S. 351 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Law Students v.
Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Ram-
sey v. United Mine Workers, 401 U.S. 302 (1971); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S.
532 (1971); Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971); United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) ; Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971) ; Rogers v. Bel-
lei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971); Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. 49 (1971); United
States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971); Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99 (1971) ;
James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183
(1971); United States v. Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971); California v. Byers,
402 U.S. 424 (1971); Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971); Gordon v. Lance, 403
U.S. 1 (1971); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Whitecomb v.
Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971);
United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217
(1971); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). The total number of dis-
senting opinions during the term was ninety-one, the highest number in ten years.
Opinions in which Marshall concurred during this term were Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Boyle v. Landry,
401 U.S. 37 (1971); Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971); United
States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971); Early v. Di Censo, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Among the more significant cases decided during the term in which Marshall
joined in the majority were Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1970);
Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Swann v. Charlotte-Meck-
lenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535
(1971); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Griffin v. Brecken-
ridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971); and Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
14
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1973], Art. 2
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol4/iss2/2
JUSTICE MARSHALL 197
particular war does not." With respect to the claims that the section vi-
olated First Amendment guarantees, the Associate Justice concluded:
... our analysis of § 6 (j) shows that the impact of conscription on ob-
jectors to particular wars is far from unjustified. The conscription laws,
applied to such persons as to others, are not designed to interfere with
any religious ritual or practice, and do not work penalty against any
theological position. The incidental burdens felt by persons in petitioners'
position are strictly justified by substantial governmental interests that
relate directly to the very impacts questioned. And more broadly, of
course, there is the Government's interest in procuring the manpower
necessary for military purposes, pursuant to the constitutional grant of
power to Congress to raise and support armies.
In a number of important decisions Marshall's joining with the ma-
jority was a crucial factor. One case which attracted a great deal of public
attention was Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), which centered
on the constitutionality of three provisions of the Voting Rights Act of
1970; these lowered the minimum age of voters in both state and federal
elections from twenty-one to eighteen; barred the use of literacy-and
similar requirements for eligibility-for a five-year period in state and fed-
eral elections in areas where this was not already prohibited by the Voting
Rights Act of 1965; and forbade states from disqualifying voters in pres-
idential and vice-presidential elections for failure to meet state residency
requirements and provided uniform national rules for absentee voting in
such elections. In an opinion by Black, the Court upheld the second pro-
vision by a 9-0 margin and the third provision with Harlan in dissent; the
Court split drastically over the question of lowering the voting age to
eighteen in state and federal elections, however. With Justice Black pro-
viding the "swing" vote and Burger, Blackmun, Harlan, and Stewart dis-
senting, the Court voted 5-4 to uphold the section applying to federal elec-
tions as a "necessary and proper" power of Congress under Article I,
Section 4, and Article II, Section 1, but voiding the section applying to
state elections, since the constitution reserves the power to the states. Dis-
senting in part, Brennan, White, Marshall, and Douglas felt that there
was ample evidence to support the contention of Congress that it could
lower the voting age in state elections in order to enforce that Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Baird v. State Bar of
Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971), Black joined by Douglas, Brennan, and Mar-
shall-with Stewart filing a concurring opinion, and Burger, Blackman,
Harlan, and White dissenting-held that a state bar committee's power
15
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to inquire about an applicant's beliefs or associations, including member-
ship in the Communist party, is limited by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, which prohibit excluding a person from the legal profes-
sion solely because of membership in a political organization or because
of his beliefs. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the
decision turned on the reasonableness of a search. Edward Coolidge had
been convicted of murder on the basis of evidence obtained by a search of
his car under the authority of a warrant issued by the attorney general
acting as justice of the peace. Coolidge objected to admission of the ev-
idence at the trial on the ground that the attorney general had not only
assumed charge of the investigation but was also the chief prosecutor in
the case. The evidence was admitted, and Coolidge was convicted. On
appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. Justice Stewart,
speaking for the majority-Black, Blackmun, White, and Burger dissent-
ing-held that the search warrant did not satisfy the requirements of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments because it was not issued by a
"neutral and detached magistrate." The judgment was reversed, and the
case was remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the
Court's opinion. In what turned out to be the most sensational case of the
term, the Court in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
( 1971 ) (together with United States v. Washington Post Company) held,
per curiam, that the United States government had not met the "heavy
burden of showing justification" in seeking to enjoin publication by the
press of a classified study entitled "History of U.S. Decision-Making
Process on Viet Nam Policy" and better known as the Pentagon Papers.
Burger, Harlan, and Blackmun wrote separate dissenting opinions, while
each of the remaining Justices wrote concurring opinions. Marshall, sup-
porting the Court's decision, pointed out:
Even if it is determined that the Government could not in good faith
bring criminal prosecutions against the New York Times and the Wash-
ington Post, it is clear that Congress has specifically rejected passing
legislation that would have clearly given the President the power he
seeks here and made the current activity of the newspapers unlawful.
When Congress specifically declines to make conduct unlawful it is not
for this Court to redecide those issues-to overrule Congress.
In a no less significant decision, but one in which Marshall's vote was
not critical--Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402
U.S. 1-the Court, by a 9-0 vote, upheld a federal district order requiring
16
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the use of busing to bring about integration of the Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg, North Carolina, school system. Chief Justice Burger, in delivering
the opinion of the Court, stated that the district courts have broad dis-
cretion in ending dual -school systems, including "bus transportation as
one tool of school desegregation."'"
Finally, five of Marshall's dissents during the term best typify the in-
creasingly conservative coloration of the Court's decisions. In Dutton v.
Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), the Court upheld the use of heresay evidence
concerning the incriminating statements of a co-conspirator made out of
court in order to convict an accomplice of first-degree murder. Mr. Justice
Stewart, in delivering the 5-4 decision, felt that, since there were nineteen
other witnesses for -the prosecution, the admission of the statement into
evidence did not violate the defendant's right to confrontation of wit-
nesses under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, since it bore "indicia
of reliability" that fully warranted its being placed before the jury. In
dissent, Marshall joined by Black, Douglas, and Brennan, felt that the de-
fendant was entitled to a new trial:
If "indicia of reliability" are so easy to come by, and prove so much,
then it is only reasonable to ask whether the Confrontation Clause has
any independent vitality at all in protecting a criminal defendant against
the use of extrajudicial statements not subject to cross-examination...
I believe the Confrontation Clause has been sunk if any out-of-court
statement bearing an indicium of a probative likelihood can come in, no
matter how damaging the statement may be or how great the need for
the truth-discovering test of cross-examination.
In contrast to its decision in Baird, the Court in Law Students Civil
Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971), in a
5-4 decision upheld New York's requirement that prior to admission to the
state bar the applicant must show that he possesses "the character and gen-
eral fitness" to be an attorney. He must take an oath that he will support
the United States and New York Constitutions. Marshall, joined by Bren-
nan, dissented on the ground that the requirement "overreaches legitimate
concerns and places an impossible burden on the exercise of fundamental
rights." (Douglas joined Black in an additional dissent.) Noting that he
would not upset the rule calling for an inquiry as to the "fitness" of ap-
plicants, the Associate Justice continued:
1" For related cases see North Carolina State Board v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43
(1971), and Davis v. Board of School Commissioners, 402 U.S. 33 (1971).
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New York is not content with a politically neutral investigation into the
fitness of Bar applicants to -practice law. Screening officials are specif-
ically directed by state law to assess an applicant's political beliefs and
loyalties, and to scrutinize his associational and other political activities
for signs that the applicant holds certain viewpoints. Such an inquiry, in
my view, flatly offends the First Amendment, and state laws or admin-
istrative rules which license such an inquiry must be struck down.
In James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), the Court by a 5-3 vote
upheld the validity of Article XXXIV of the California constitution which
prohibited the development, construction, or acquisition by any state pub-
lic body of a low-rent housing project without the approval of a majority
of those voting at a community election. Mr. Justice Black, speaking for
the Court, stated that the procedure for mandatory referenda, which is not
limited solely to low-cost housing proposals, ensures democratic decision-
making and does not violate "equal protection of the laws" as guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Douglas abstained, while Justices
Brennan and Blackmun joined Marshall in dissent; this was the first ma-
jor case, incidentally, in which Justice Blackmun split with the Chief
Justice. In his opinion, Marshall attacked the provision because it "ex-
plicitly singles out low-income persons to bear its burden," since prior
referenda need not be held for public housing for the aged, veterans, state
employees, and others. He concluded:
.. after observing that the article does not discriminate on the basis of
race, the Court's only response to the real question in these cases is the
unresponsive assertion that "referendums demonstrate devotion to de-
mocracy, not to bias, discrimination, or prejudice." It is far too late in
the day to contend that the Fourteenth prohibits only racial discrim-
ination; and to me, singling out the poor to bear a burden.., tramples
the values that the Fourteenth ... was designed to protect.
In a related case, Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), the
Court in a 5-4 decision held that the City Council of Jackson, Mississippi,
could close four of its public swimming pools rather than comply with
federal court orders to desegregate them, on the claim that the pools could
not be operated safely and economically on an integrated basis without
violating the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 Nor, in 'the opinion delivered by
Justice Black, could the Court find the action of the City Council in sur-
rendering its lease on the fifth pool to the YMCA, which continued to op-
" The city council did desegregate its other public recreational facilities, in-
cluding its five public parks.
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erate it on a segregated basis, a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Associate Justices Marshall, White, Brennan, and Douglas felt otherwise.
In his dissenting opinion, Marshall, joined by Brennan and White, held
the view that if the logic put forth by the City Council, and accepted by
the majority, were to be extended, then "schools or even golf courses could
be closed." Marshall stated:
By effectively removing publicly owned swimming pools from the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment-at least if the pools are out-
side school buildings-the majority and concurring opinions turn the
clock back 17 years. After losing a hard fought legal battle ,to maintain
segregation in public facilities, the ... authorities now seek to pick and
choose which of the existing facilities will be kept open. Their choice is
rationalized on the basis of economic need and is even more transparent
than putting the matter to a referendum vote.
In the last case to be discussed-Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672
(1971)-the Court held valid all but one of the provisions of the Higher
Education Facilities Act of 1963, which provides federal construction
grants for colleges and university facilities excluding those "used or to be
used for sectarian instruction or as a place for religious worship, or . . .
primarily in connection with any part of the program of a school or de-
partment of divinity." However, Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the
majority, invalidated the provision limiting federal interest in the facilities
(to a period of twenty years) as violative of the religion clauses of the
First Amendment, since this would result in a contribution to a religious
body. While agreeing with the latter portion of the Court's decision,
Douglas, joined by Black and Marshall (Justice Brennan filed a separate
dissent) dissented on the grounds "that even a small amount coming out
of the pocket of taxpayers" and going into the coffers of church-supported
schools is not "in keeping with our constitutional ideal."
When the Court adjourned on June 30, 1971-the latest adjournment
date since 1958-the profound feeling prevailed that the Burger Court
had begun to stamp its imprint on American constitutional history-an
imprint much more "conservative" and restrainist in coloration than that
of the Court under Earl Warren. In the four terms that had passed since
Marshall had taken his seat, the "liberal" majority of five had become a
minority of three. The addition of Associate Justices Powell and Rehnquist
to fill the seats vacated by Black and Harlan at the beginning of the 1971
term, coupled with the ages of Douglas (seventy-three), Brennan (sixty-
19
Bland: Justice Thurgood Marshall: An Analysis of His First Years on the
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1973
202 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
five), and Marshall (sixty-three), make it probable that the swing of the
ideological pendulum had just begun. As he was re-elected, President
Nixon will probably have the opportunity to name three other justices to
the High Court in addition to the four he has already selected. In that case
the Court will be "balanced" for some time to come.
As to Marshall's performance as an Associate Justice thus far, one is
forced to be less than complimentary. This evaluation is made with full
realization that as a junior member of the Court, particularly during the
first two terms, he has probably had few opportunities to make a significant
contribution. In addition, Marshall has not always been in the best of
health; his participation on the Court was sharply curtailed by severe ill-
ness during the latter part of the 1969 term. Nevertheless, by any reason-
able standard of objectivity, a review of the sixty opinions contributed by
Marshall during his first four terms discloses a noticeable lack of judicial
scholarship. 14 In the main, his opinions included many, usually lengthy
quotations from cited cases; they presented precious little original thought
or distinguished conceptualizations. In all fairness, essentially the same
criticism could be leveled at most of the justices who have served on the
Supreme Court since its creation. Justices recognized for their unique
capabilities-John Marshall, Roger Brooke Taney, Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Louis Brandeis, Benjamin Cardozo, Felix Frankfurter, and Hugo
Black-have proved to be the exception, not the rule. Perhaps Marshall's
greatest single contribution since joining the Court was to win over a
majority of his brethren to his view that the "double jeopardy" prohibition
of the Fifth Amendment should be made enforceable against the states,
the majority opinion of which he authored in Benton v. Maryland (1969).
Moreover, the Associate Justice has adequately presented and defended
a "liberal" judicial philosophy characterized by general support of the
government in exercising its delegated powers, but not arbitrarily at the
expense of the constitutional rights of individuals. While it is true that Mr.
Justice Marshall has yet to put the finishing touch on his judicial portrait,
one would nevertheless feel compelled to suggest that his most meaningful
contribution to constitutional law will be evaluated in terms of his ac-
tivities as an advocate, not as a jurist.
"' This number includes only those cases disposed of by written opinion, not per
curiam decisions.
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